Chapter
V
Results
of the Protocol Study
In
this chapter I focus on the part of the protocol reported in Appendix A. This
protocol was the second of the three protocols obtained from these subjects.
Recall that the first protocol was intended as a introduction to the problem,
and that I expect that in the second protocol the subjects will have a good
notion of the task and how to accomplish it.
Modeling the
Conversation
Having transcribed the protocol as described
in Chapter IV, the illocutions of the acts noted in the transcripts were then
developed through interpretation of (1) the specifics of the verbal and non‑verbal
behaviors associated with the act, (2) the known context of the conversation,
and (3) the context of the conversation reasonably imputable to the subjects.
In Cohen’s (1984) terms, I derived the illocutionary acts as a rational
strategy of action, given attributions of the participants’ beliefs, goals, and
expectations at the point in the discourse in which the illocutionary acts actually
occurred. Note that the apparent subjectiveness of this method is both
unavoidable and unobjectionable. It is unavoidable in a qualitative study which
seeks to model otherwise unobtainable mental states; post-elicitation of
subjects’ mental states about comprehension and production are likely to
produce confabulations, because the states and acts are generally unconscious
ones. The subjectiveness is unobjectionable because there really is no single
objective account of the conversation. Although the conversants are repairing a
shared model of the conversation, the sharedness is a subjective quality; they
do not really share the actual verbatim states. Therefore, an interpretation of
the interaction which plausibly explains the interchange can be taken as both
valid and useful. This approach is consistent by recent work in understanding
language as an action situated in its context (Suchman, 1987). In this view,
the aim of research into language as action is not to produce formal models but
to explore the relation of knowledge and action to the particular circumstances
in which knowing and acting occur. This approach requires changes in the
methodology of research on purposeful linguistic action:
The first [change] is a fundamental change in
perspective, such that the contingence of action on a complex world of objects,
artifacts, and other actors, located in space and time, is no longer treated as
an extraneous problem with which the individual actor must contend, but rather
is seen as the essential resource that makes knowledge possible and gives
action its sense. The second change is a renewed commitment to grounding
theories of action in empirical evidence: that is, to building generalizations
inductively from records of particular, naturally occurring activities, and
maintaining the theory’s accountability to that evidence. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, this approach assumes that the coherence of action is not
adequately explained by either preconceived cognitive schema or institutionalized
social norms. Rather, the organization of situated action is an emergent
property of moment‑by‑moment interactions between actions, and
between actors and the environment of their action. (Suchman, 1987, p. 179)
Accordingly,
based on the hierarchy of illocutionary acts in conversation presented in
Figure 2, and its elaboration in Chapter III into a taxonomy, an initial
interpretation of the illocution of the conversants’ acts was determined. This
set of acts and their mapping onto conversational phenomena were refined in
successive passes back over the protocol. The final set of acts is listed in
Appendix B, Predicate Representations.
Modeling of
Meta-Locutionary Acts
From
the transcribed and coded protocol, I developed a representation of one of the
conversants’ model of their conversation. That is, as described in Chapter II,
the conversants are viewed as jointly constructing a conversation. Each
conversant is checking his or her model of the constructed conversation against
the actual evidence of the conversation, namely the utterances themselves in
their context. Although the terms may be slightly confusing here, the model
which I developed of A’s model is, in effect, a hypothesis as to a set of
beliefs which would permit a rational agent to achieve this particular coherent
conversation under the contextual circumstances. Thus beginning with some
reasonably inferred state, A’s model can be updated act-by-act to reflect
additions and deletions from the state of the conversation. Figure 10 shows the
initial second of the protocol, the initial state of A’s model (after B’s act
Bi1, which is directed to the experimenter and is not further considered here),
the changes in A’s model resulting from A and B’s conversational acts, and the
state of A’s model after A’s act Ai2.9 The initial state reflects
A’s immediate domain knowledge and her immediate domain goal. The changes in
A’s model due to the acts of both A and B represent A’s perceptions of the
effects on the shared conversational model. Note that a similar set of
perceptions, changes, and states can be constructed for B. Both A and B’s
models, though, should be viewed as representing what A and B respectively
believe the state of the conversation to be. Thus from an initial state of (i) A’s not knowing the first letter of the sequence and
(ii) A wanting B to inform her of the first letter, the sequence of acts B2,
A1, A2 results in the state of A’s model being that (i)
A does not know the first letter of the sequence, (ii) A wants B to inform her
of the first letter, (iii) it is A’s turn in the conversation, and (iv) A has
informed B that A does not know the first letter.
Using
this technique, the state of A’s model of the conversation was determined after
each act identified in the transcribed segment of the protocol. This account of
A’s model is set out in Appendix C.
T 00.0 00.2 00.4 00.6 00.8 01.0...
=============================================
Av blank...................
Ap (turn'g-hUBeB)hDB...
Ai Ai1 Ai2
Bv 'kay....................
Bp (hAeA,rlhU) rlhD,together,leaning-back
Bi Bi1 Bi2
Bi1: {indicating that conversation can start}
= not(know(A,<first letter>))
= wants(A,inform(B,A,<first letter>))
Bi2: give‑turn(B,A)[1][1][1]
+ accedes(B,(turn(A))
Ai1: acknowledge-turn(A)
‑ accedes(B,(turn(A))
+ turn(A)
Ai2: inform(A,B,{?X = doesn't have first letter})
+ informed(A,B,not(know(A,<first letter>)))
not(know(A,<first letter>))
wants(A,inform(B,A,<first letter>))
turn(A)
informed(A,B,not(know(A,<first letter>)))
Figure 10. Illocutionary interpretation of the
protocol. The figure contains the first second of the protocol, the initial
state of A’s model (after B’s act Bi1, which is directed to the experimenter
and is not further considered here), the changes in A’s model resulting from A
and B’s conversational acts, and the state of A’s model after A’s act Ai2. `=‘
denotes a predicate initially part of the state, `+’ denotes addition of a
predicate to the state, and `‑‘ denotes removal of a predicate from the
state.
Conversational Operators
From the illocutionary acts and the state‑models
representations of the conversational structure, I initiated development of a
set of operators for the acts, as delineated in Appendix D. The representation
used here and in Appendix D is a simplification for purposes of clarity of the
more complex form of rule actually used in the simulation discussed in Chapter
VI. An example of one of the conversational operators is presented in Figure
11. The left‑hand side “IF” part of the operator represents a set of
felicity conditions for execution of the operator. The right-hand “THEN” clause
of the operator identifies the act (or acts) to be taken if the “IF” conditions
are satisfied. These acts constitute the conversant’s contribution to the
structure of the conversation. The changes in the conversant’s account of the
mutual model of the conversation are noted in the “EFFECTS” part of the
operator.
IF not(mutually‑known(me,Other,wants(me,Act))
request(me,Other,Act)
turn(me)
THEN repeat(request(me,Other,Act))
EFFECTS ‑ not(mutually‑known(me,Other,wants(me,Act))
+ mutually‑known(me,Other,wants(me,Act))
Figure 11. Operator repeat‑act‑1. The left‑hand‑side clauses are
matched against the conversants model. If all clauses are true and the operator
is executed, the acts “repeat” and “give-turn” are performed, with their
variables instantiated as matched in the “IF” clauses. The conversant’s model
is modified by the accordingly instantiated “EFFECTS” clauses.
Thus given the state of A’s model of the
conversation just after act Bi6, the “IF” part of the operator matches clauses
7 and 2 of the model, plus Act Ai4 of the conversation. This instantiates the operator as shown in
Act Ai5. The instantiated “EFFECTS” clauses are then applied to the state,
resulting in the new state following the act.
The details of the process are set out in Figure 12. Examples of meta-locutionary conversational
operators developed from analysis of the protocols are presented in Appendix D.
A's state after act Bi6:
(1) wants(A,inform(B,A,<first letter>))
(2) turn(A)
(3) informed(A,B,not(know(A,<first letter>)))
(4) mutually-known(wants(B,turn(B)))
(5) wants(B,clarify(A,?X)
(6) mutually-known(not(know(A,<first letter>)))
(7) not(mutually-known(wants(A,inform(B,A,<first letter>))))
A's act Ai5:
repeat(A,request(A,B,inform(B,A,{?Y = first letter})))
give‑turn(A,B)
Effects on A's model:
‑ not(mutually-known(wants(A,inform(B,A,<first letter>))))
‑ mutually-known(wants(B,turn(B)))
‑ turn(A)
+ mutually-known(wants(A,inform(B,A,<first letter>)))
+ turn(B)
A's State after act Ai5:
(1) wants(A,inform(B,A,<first letter>))
(3) informed(A,B,not(know(A,<first letter>)))
(5) wants(B,clarify(A,?X)
(6) mutually-known(not(know(A,<first letter>)))
(8) mutually-known(wants(A,inform(B,A,<first letter>)))
(9) turn(B).
Figure 12. Application of operator repeat-act-1
after act Bi6. The enumerated facts represent the state of A’s active
memory. At the beginning of the figure,
A’s state of understanding of the conversation is portrayed immediately after B
takes act Bi6. Based on this state, then, A takes the acts which make up act
Ai5. The effects of these acts on A’s model of the conversation are then set
out. The figure concludes with A’s new model of the conversation, after
application of the effects of act Ai5.
Note that the changes in conversants’ turns are effected through a
simultaneous application of a give‑turn operator.
From
these operators conversational plans can be developed. Such plans are not
intended to describe multiple turns but rather are intended to show how
different operators can be combined through a planning process to achieve
complex acts within a turn. For example, if the conditions for application of
repeat‑act‑1 were present except for `turn(me)’ then an operator
such as T1 might be applied to facilitate repeat-act-1. I want to stress here
that the use of operators which can be embodied in rules does not mean that I
have proposed a planning system. In the set of operators which were developed
from the protocol study and were adapted into the simulation, none relied on
backchaining or chained through a single cycle. Rather, the operators were
constructed to model (1) situated responses to local context, (2) goal-directed
inference reflecting intentionality, and (3) understanding. Conversations
resulting from application of the operators as written achieve their
interactive behavior entirely through recognition of situations and then consequently
posting goals. Suchman (1987) has observed that real conversations are not
planned top-down, although later analysis can usually be parsed into plan-like
structures:
While the organization ... of any interaction
can be analyzed post hoc into a hierarchical structure of topics and subtopics,
or routines and subroutines, the coherence that the structure represents is
actually achieved moment by moment, as a local, collaborative, sequential
accomplishment. This stands in marked contrast to the assumptions of students
of discourse to the effect that the actual enactment of interaction is the
behavioral realization of a plan. Instead, every instance of coherent
interaction is an essentially local production, accomplished collaboratively in
real time .... (Suchman, 1987, p. 94)
Accordingly,
the operators proposed here are to be interpreted as constituting local
behaviors which, in the aggregate, produce coherent linguistic action. In the
implementation of the model as a rule‑based system, as discussed in Chapter
VI, the felicity of every operator is assessed on each cycle. Of course
conversations have structure; they are intentional processes. In the model
proposed here, intentionality is represented by the posting of goals in active
memory. Whether a goal is subsequently attained is not a function of the
operator that posted the goal. Rather, the achievement or abandonment is a
consequent of the matching and executing of later instantiation of operators in
response to the local conditions then existing. A person may enter into a
conversation intending to ask after the health of the other party’s spouse but
never attain that goal because other more urgent matters capture the
conversational focus. The person is not stuck with a stack‑based planning
model which prevents the person from concluding the conversation without
mentioning the other’s spouse. Such goals are simply abandoned in the face of
later local situations. The meta‑locutionary model, then, despite
relationships among operators, has more of an opportunistic control structure
than that of traditional planning systems. The overall structure of a
conversation certainly exists in the sense that a given initial--or subsequent,
for that matter--state of a conversant’s memory plus his set of operators create,
in effect, an expectation as to the conversation’s path. Yet the coherence of
the interaction does not depend on that specific path being followed. Each
change in the state as a result of interaction creates a new implicit path for
the conversation (which could be the same as the old path if the interaction
follows expectations). It is also important to note that the conversants’ acts
noted in the protocol are complex: they are effected through multiple
simultaneous acts at different conversational levels. For example, A’s act Ai5
shown in Figure 12 consists of acts at both the repair and turn‑taking
levels.
Application of the Model
The
modeling techniques described above permitted development of plausible
explanations of a number of interesting aspects of the conversation. Here I
analyze a portion of the protocol in terms of meta-locutionary acts involving
reference, turn-taking, and repair. The relevant section of the transcript is
presented in Figure 13. The analysis suggests that even in such an apparently
simple domain as the joint-recall task, the conversants encounter coherence
difficulties which require relatively complex meta-locutionary interaction to
resolve. Further, the conversants’ speech acts demonstrate an information‑systemic
rationale for the use of indirect speech acts; this arises from the
conversants’ mutual responsibility for maintenance of the conversational belief
structure.
T 00.0 00.2 00.4 00.6 00.8 01.0 01.2 01.4 01.6 01.8...
=========================================================================
Av blank.................................
Ap (turning‑hUBeB) hDB...
Ai Ai1Ai2
Bv 'kay....................
Bp (hAeA,rlhU) rlhD,together,leaning‑back mO.......
Bi Bi1 Bi2 Bi4[1][1]
T 02.0 02.2 02.4 02.6 02.8 03.0 03.2 03.4 03.6 03.8...
=========================================================================
Av is...the.....first...one....so....what...was.the.first
Ap eBlink
Ai Ai3 Ai4 ....Ai5
Bv "O"...........
Bp mO
Bi Bi5 Bi6
T 04.0 04.2
04.4 04.6 04.8
05.0 05.2 05.4
05.6 05.8...
=========================================================================
Av ....one........ OK...........
Ap eBlink
Ai Ai6 Ai6a
Bv "O"...... an'.I.....
Bp eBlink
Bi Bi7 Bi8 Bi10
T 06.0 06.2
06.4 06.6 06.8
07.0 07.2 07.4
07.6 07.8...
=========================================================================
Av "I".................. "S"............... "U"....
Ap hNod hNod/eBlink hNod/eBlink
Ai Ai7Ai8 Ai9 Ai10 Ai11
Bv ...
"U"..
Bp
hNod,hNod/eBlink.
hNod
Bi
Bi10 Bi11
Bi12
Figure 13. Partial transcript of experimental protocol.
This conversation is the beginning of the second trial for subjects A and B.
Reference/Information Acts
One
level of the taxonomy of meta‑locutionary acts presented in Chapter III
was the reference/information level. I begin the analysis of the protocol
section by looking at various acts at this level.
Request
A’s
act Ai2, about 0.5 seconds on the transcript timeline in Figure 13, is an act
of requesting that B provide information about the first symbol in A’s
sequence, a blank. This interpretation is plausible in light of the following
factors: (1) We believe that A understands the experimental task of joint
recall because she competently performed the task for the first trial.
Accordingly, she will have as a goal the act of confirming the entire sequence
as mutual. (2) Moreover, we believe that A knows that her first symbol is a
blank (because she says so). This leads to the reasonable assumption that A has
developed as a subgoal obtaining from B the letter
which corresponds to the blank. Therefore, A’s act is probably something like
request(A,B,{first letter is “blank”}).10 After act Ai2, A’s active‑memory
model of the conversation will then be something like11
not(know(A,<first letter>)).
goal(A,assert(B,A,<first
letter>))
turn(B)
mutually‑known(A,B,not(know(A,<first
letter>))).
Assert
At
Bi6, B’s act--in response to A’s act Ai4--is “assert(B, A, first letter is
“O”).” This interpretation is a plausible one in light of three factors. First,
B apparently understands the experimental task and can be construed as having
the goal that both conversants have mutual knowledge of the first letter of the
sequence. Second, A’s request (combining Ai2 and Ai3) was made as part of the
conversation, so the conversants have directly copresent knowledge of the
request; it would be plausible in the conversational context, then, for B to
have responding to A’s request as a specific goal. Third, B’s first letter is,
in fact, “O.” His act at Bi6, then, can be seen as an assertion which provides
information about a conversational referent, namely the first letter of the
sequence. B’s active‑memory model of the conversation is now probably
something like
asserted(B,{first letter is O})
turn(B).
Acknowledge
At
Bi8, B has (again) asserted that the first letter was “O.” At A’s next act,
Ai6, she confirms that she understood that the first letter was “O.” Her act is
probably something like acknowledge(A,{first letter is O}), confirm‑mutual(A,B,{first
letter is O}). Note that the second part of the act is at the mutual‑knowledge‑repair
level, for reasons discussed with respect to repair below.
Another
example of an acknowledge act is at Ai7. B has, at Bi10, just said “an I ...”
Thus as A knows that the next letter is in fact “I” she acknowledges B’s
assertion with her act Ai7, which might be coded as acknowledge(A,assert(B,{next letter is I})).12
Turn‑Taking Acts
The
protocol contains examples of situations both where turn‑taking occurred
and where it might have occurred. At Ai3 A could have given a turn but does not
do so. The context for this act is that B has invited A to speak, A says
“Blank,” B indicates that he wants to take a turn, and then A blinks. At this
point A does not give the turn to B, though, since she goes on to extend her
verbal utterance. In the meta‑locutionary interpretation of the protocol,
B’s act Bi4 constitutes a control act for the conversation, and A’s subsequent
act Ai3 is an acknowledgment of this.13 Note though, that this
acknowledgment, as lexicalized, is more of a place‑holder than a full‑blown
expression of comprehension. This act is, in a sense, a vestigial one. That is,
it marks a place in the conversation where A would have interposed an
indication of miscomprehension had she failed to understand B’s act. As A in
fact did understand the act, no indication of miscomprehension was needed. It
aids the conversational process, though, for A to mark this place in the
conversation because, absent such a marker, B may be forced to wait an
indefinite period for the miscomprehension indicator before he continues.
Accordingly, A’s act at Ai3 can be seen either as an acknowledgment of B’s act
at Bi4 or as holding her turn--because B didn’t respond for almost a second
after A said “Blank.
Give-turn
A’s
act at Ai2, where she utters “Blank,” can be viewed as a complex act. It is not
only a request, as discussed above, but also the giving of a turn. The fact
that A expects B to take the turn after Ai2 is apparent from A’s subsequent
pause between 01.6 and 02.5 seconds on the protocol timeline. A’s complete act
at Ai2, then, is probably something like request(A,B,{first letter is
“blank”}), give‑turn(A,B). This is a logical consequence of the
circumstance that A is making a request of B.
Similarly,
A’s act at Ai6a can also be viewed as something like give‑turn(A,B). Here
A has just acknowledged at Ai6 that she understands B’s assertion that the next
letter is “O.” In the absence of a turn‑taking or turn‑giving act,
the control of the conversation would appear to rest with A. B’s subsequent
picking up of the conversation at that point is evidence that the turn has been
given to him.
Acts Repairing the Mutual
Model
As
was seen to be the case with turn‑taking, there were contexts where an
act occurred and other contexts where an act might have occurred but did not.
Similar circumstances occur with respect to acts which repair the conversants’
mutual model of their interaction. The experimental protocol is replete with
occasions where one or both of the conversants is in a position to detect
divergence of their models of the conversation. In some cases, repair acts are
undertaken; in others, repair is apparently deemed not necessary. The following
discussions examines examples of both cases.
Clarification
Repairs Made
A’s
acts at Ai4 and Ai5 can both be viewed most plausibly as acts of repair of the mutual
model of the conversation. At Ai2, A has--she believes--made a request for B to
assert the first letter of the sequence because she has a blank. She waits, she
acknowledges that B seems to want at turn, and yet B doesn’t say anything. At
Ai4, then, A elaborates her utterance to make explicit the informational
content of her act at Ai2.
At
about 3.3 seconds into the conversation, at act Bi6, B asserts that the first
letter of the sequence is “O.” A, however, goes on at act Ai5 to request
explicitly that B tell her the first letter of the sequence. Why, then, does A
take act Ai5?
Conversant
A naturally enough does not have access to either B’s actual intentions in
saying “O” or to any genuinely objective account of the shared conversational
structure. Rather, she depends on her own interpretative faculties to place B’s
utterance coherently into their conversation. In this case, A’s action can be
accounted for by realizing that she interpreted B’s utterance “O” as “Oh”--that
is, acknowledging A’s statement at Ai4 but not telling her what the letter
actually is. The effect of this misunderstanding can be traced through A’s
model of the conversation. Before B’s act Bi6, A’s model is:
wants(A,inform(B,A,<first
letter>))
turn(A)
asserted(A,B,not(know(A,<first
letter>)))
mutually-known(wants(B,turn(B)))
wants(B,clarify(A,?X)
mutually-known(not(know(A,<first
letter>))).
At
Bi6, B’s act (from B’s point of view) is “assert(B, A, {first letter is “O”}),”
but A hears “Oh.” and thinks that B’s act is “mutually-known(A,B,not(know(A,<first letter>))),” but not
“acknowledge(B,request(A,B,assert(B,A,{first
letter})))).” As a consequence, A updates her model of the conversation as
follows:
‑ not(know(A,<first letter>))
+ mutually-known(not(know(A,<first
letter>)))
+ not(mutually-known(wants(A,assert(B,A,<first
letter>)))).
Applying
these changes, A’s model is now:
wants(A,assert(B,A,<first
letter>))
turn(A)
asserted(A,B,not(know(A,<first
letter>)))
mutually-known(wants(B,turn(B)))
wants(B,clarify(A,?X)
mutually-known(not(know(A,<first
letter>)))
not(mutually‑known(wants(A,assert(B,A,<first letter>)))).
Note
that A and B’s models have diverged significantly at this point, since B’s
model of the conversation, as discussed above with respect to assert acts, presumably
contains something like
asserted(B, A,{first letter is “O”})
mutually‑known(A,B,{first letter is “O”}).
In
A’s version of the conversation, though, the state is that A has told B that
her first letter is blank, B has indicated that he has understood this, but B
has not told her what the letter was. A thus concludes that B must not have
interpreted her utterance at Ai4 as a request. This leads her to then repeat
her request in act Ai5. When B in turn repeats “O,” A presumably realizes their
misunderstanding and updates her model accordingly.
It
could be argued that B’s long pause (between 01.5 and 02.5 seconds of the
transcript) before A again begins speaking represents his non‑comprehension
of A’s act at Ai2. This interpretation, however, is implausible in light of the
express negotiation of interaction patterns which had just taken place a few
minutes before in the previous “training” protocol. It is consistent with the
negotiated forms of interaction from the first protocol for B to understand
that A had a blank for her first letter. If anything, B’s pause should be
ascribed to an expectation that A was going to continue recounting her
sequence.
It
may also be true that physical constraints on cognition are determining some
aspects of A’s utterance at Ai5. If she hears B say “O” while she is producing
the utterance, she may simply finish her utterance. In either case, though, B
hears A make a clarification of her original request.
Implications
for Computational Views of Indirect Speech Acts
The
modeling and explication of this exchange also has some implications for the
theory of indirect speech acts. Unlike indirect acts resulting from politeness
(as discussed in Chapter I), here we see evidence of indirection arising from
coupling a desire for efficiency with the creation of the conversation as a
shared structure. A’s act at Ai2, where she opens the verbal part of the
conversation with "Blank," is indirect. Although her direct act is,
on its face, an assertion, but she clearly intends the utterance to function as
a request. B certainly interprets it as a request. Thus if the underlying
logical structure of A’s act was really request(A,B,inform(B,A,
?Y = first letter))), why didn’t she just make a direct request or question
along the lines of “What’s the first letter?”
The
reason for A’s indirection comes from the meta‑character of A’s discourse
interaction. She is engaged in the process of building with B a mutual model of
the context. For both A and B to have mutual knowledge of the true character of
the sequence, A needs to tell B that she has blank for her first letter. But,
if this is the case, why then did A not say something like “I have a blank so
what’s the first letter?” Here the reason appears to be efficiency. It is more
efficient just to assert “I have a blank” because this utterance also functions
as an indirect speech act constituting a request. A’s striving for efficiency
is apparent from the form of her actual locution, which is simply “Blank.” When
A then misapprehends that B has perceived only her direct act and has failed to
perceive the indirect act, she then produces the request as a direct act: “...
so what is the first letter?”
This
analysis thus suggests that some indirect speech acts may result from meta‑locutionary
attempts to maintain the shared model of the conversation while interacting
efficiently. This is a systematic, as opposed to a socially conventional,
motivation for indirect speech acts. That is, while some acts appear to
establish social relationships or conform to social expectations of politeness,
the indirect act taken by A here appears to arise directly from the nature of
language as a medium for interaction.
Clarification
Repairs Not Made
In
the preceding discussion, I suggested that at Bi6 B intends to tell A that the
first letter is “O” but A understands B as meaning “Oh” and simply confirming
that he understood her. Having just gone through this miscommunication and
minor repair, B is again coïncidentally misunderstood
by A in his act Bi10. Interestingly, the misunderstanding is precisely the
converse of what they had just experienced. At Ai6a gives the turn back to B. B
then says “an’ I ...” and A immediately confirms at Ai7 and Ai8 that the next
letter is indeed “I.” A’s further recitation of the succeeding letters is
evidence that she believes that their understanding is mutual that the second
letter is “I.” At Bi10, then, it is probable that A interprets B’s act as
something like inform(B,A,{next letter is “I”}). As a result, A’s model of the
conversation in plausibly in this state:
Mutually-known(A,B,{first letter is O})
turn(B)
mutually-known(A,B,{second letter is I})
However,
A’s interpretation, which then leads to her acts at Ai7 and Ai8, is mistaken.
Obviously, she does not have direct access to B’s sequence and therefore did
not know that B’s second letter was a blank! In other words, if we were
following B’s model instead of A’s, B’s act at Bi10 is actually the start of
something like “inform(B,A,{my next letter is a blank}.” Lexicalized, the full
locution of B’s aborted utterance would probably have been “and I ... have a
blank.” Through coïncidence, A’s second letter turned out to have been “I,” so
she heard B’s utterance not as a word but as a letter. Note that this is
virtually the exact converse of her misunderstanding about “O.”
In
this case, though, no repair utterances ensue. This appears to be the result of
fairly rapid inference on B’s part. A stretches out her locution confirming “I”
and after 0.5 second B nods twice rapidly and blinks (perhaps in astonishment).
B does not need to repair the conversation because at that point B knows that
the knowledge that “I” is the second letter is mutual. At this point, then, the
conversants have different models of what they think the discourse is, but only
B knows this. He’s satisfied to continue confirming the recitation of the
subsequent letters because the future path of the conversation is not likely to
be adversely affected. Eventually the conversants’ complete their joint recall
of the sequence without A ever learning that B’s second symbol was a blank.
Consequences
of Repairs
The
attenuated acknowledgment at Ai3 is quite a contrast to the explicit verbal
acknowledgment given by A after B’s act Bi8. When at Bi8 B repeats “O,” A
responds at Ai6 with “OK.” In both cases A is effectively confirming the
mutuality of the shared model of the conversation. Why, then, are the acts she
takes so different? The answer, as suggested in the model set out in Appendix
C, is that in Ai6 A was coping with the consequences of the preceding
misunderstanding. If this had been a response to B’s first utterance “O” at
Bi6, a normally vestigial response might well have been appropriate, since in
this case there would have been no miscomprehension. The actual circumstances
at Ai6, though, were that miscomprehension had in fact been communicated by A,
so a place‑marker response could be seen as ambiguous; an explicit
affirmative response was thus called for.
These
differences can be seen in the particulars of the acts which A takes at Ai3 and
Ai6. At Ai3, A’s act is simply “assert(A, B, comprehend(A, take‑turn(B))).”
At Ai6, her act is necessarily more complex: “acknowledge(A, {first letter is
O})” and “confirm‑mutual(A, B, first letter is O).” It is the addition of
the confirm‑mutual act which results in the explicit acknowledgment.
The Computational
Utility of Meta-Locutionary Acts
In looking at examples of various
meta-locutionary acts at different conversational levels, I have tried to point
out how explication of the interaction in terms of these acts provides a
plausible, rational basis for reconstruction of the conversants’ linguistic
behaviors. In considering turn‑taking, for example, the analysis suggests
that meta-locutionary acts at the turn-taking level can be applied to a
representation of the conversational context to produce an adequate explanation
of control. These qualities might be extended to actual control of interaction
through appropriate implementation of the operators. In Chapter VI, then, I
present a partial implementation of the model in order to show that the theory
is sufficient to produce behaviors that, under simulated conditions similar to
those encountered and created by the actual conversants, reasonably replicate
the kind of interaction observed in the protocol.
9.In
Figure 9 and in the discussion, these notational conventions are followed:
Indices: T time, Av A's verbal, Bv B's verbal, Ap A's physical, Bp B's physical, Ai A's illocution, Bi B's
illocution; Body: h head, e eyes, a arm, ah hand, r right, l left, f finger, m
mouth; Directions: U up, D down, L left, R right; Referents: A conversant, B
conversant, O object, E experimenter; Actions: W forehead-wrinkles, C
forehead-clear, O open-mouth, S close-mouth; Notation: () previous state, ...
duration.
10.
Actually, Ai2 is somewhat more complex in that it also has a turn-taking
component. The turn-taking aspects of the act are discussed later in this
section.
11.
The notation used in these examples is more abstract than that used in the
simulation. Conversants no doubt keep track of additional information about
these states, including temporal information. For purposes of
understandability, the memorial predicates used here are simplified to make
clear their most relevant features.
12.
It turns out that B’s act Bi10 could not have been assert(B,<next letter is
I>) because he did not know the next letter was “I.” I examine the
consequences of this in the discussion of repair acts below. Nevertheless, A’s
act Ai7 is still a valid act, because it depends on her interpretation of what
B meant at Bi10.
13.
The analysis here of A’s blink at Ai3 as an act of acknowledgment does not
imply that blinks can be uniformly interpreted as having this meaning. First,
the meaning of action is provided by its context; a blink under different
circumstances will communicate different information to the other
conversant--even “I've got some dust in my eye.” Second, actions may be
involuntary concomitants of communication. See the discussion of intention and
action in Chapter III and the discussion of lexicalization in Chapter VI.