In Tenth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011).
This is the author's version of the work.
It is posted here by permission of IFAAMAS for personal use, not for redistribution.
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Abstract
Game theory is fast becoming a vital tool for reasoning about complex real-world security problems, including critical infrastructure
protection. The game models for these applications are constructed
using expert analysis and historical data to estimate the values of
key parameters, including the preferences and capabilities of terrorists.
In many cases, it would be natural to represent uncertainty over
these parameters using continuous distributions (such as uniform
intervals or Gaussians). However, existing solution algorithms are
limited to considering a small, finite number of possible attacker
types with different payoffs. We introduce a general model of infinite
Bayesian Stackelberg security games that allows payoffs to be
represented using continuous payoff distributions. We then develop
several techniques for finding approximate solutions for this class
of games, and show empirically that our methods offer dramatic
improvements over the current state of the art, providing new ways
to improve the robustness of security game models.
