Comparing Strategic Secrecy and Stackelberg Commitment in Security Games
(Q Guo, B. An, B. Bosansky, C. Kiekintveld)
In Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI17),. 2017.
This is the author's version of the work.
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Abstract
The Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) has
drawn extensive attention recently in several security
domains. However, the SSE concept neglects
the advantage of defender's strategic revelation
of her private information, and overestimates
the observation ability of the adversaries. In
this paper, we overcome these restrictions and
analyze the tradeoff between strategic secrecy and
commitment in security games. We propose a
Disguised-resource Security Game (DSG) where
the defender strategically disguises some of her
resources. We compare strategic information revelation
with public commitment and formally show
that they have different advantages depending the
payoff structure. To compute the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE), several novel approaches are
provided, including a novel algorithm based on
support set enumeration, and an approximation
algorithm for -PBE. Extensive experimental
evaluation shows that both strategic secrecy and
Stackelberg commitment are critical measures in
security domain, and our approaches can efficiently
solve PBEs for realistic-sized problems.
