# Current Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Is Optimal: A Proof

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***Abstract*—One of the main reasons for the current interest in quantum computing is that, in principle, quantum algorithms can break the RSA encoding, the encoding that is used for the majority secure communications – in particular, the majority of e-commerce transactions are based on this encoding. This does not mean, of course, that with the emergence of quantum computers, there will no more ways to secretly communicate: while the existing non-quantum schemes will be compromised, there exist a quantum cryptographic scheme that will enables us to secretly exchange information. In this scheme, however, there is a certain probability that an eavesdropper will not be detected. A natural question is: can we decrease this probability by an appropriate modification of the current quantum cryptography algorithm? In this paper, we show that such a decrease is not possible: the current quantum cryptography algorithm is, in some reasonable sense, optimal.**

***Index Terms*—quantum cryptography, quantum computing, optimality**

## I. Formulation of the Problem

**Why quantum computing.** In many practical problems, we need to process large amounts of data in a limited time. To be able to do it, we need computations to be as fast as possible. While computations are already fast, there are many important problems for which we still cannot get the results on time. For example, it has been shown that, in principle, we can predict with a reasonable accuracy where the tornado will go in the next 15 minutes, but at present, the corresponding computations take days on the fastest existing high performance computer.

One of the main limitations on the speed of modern computers is the fact that, according to modern physics, the speed of all the processes is limited by the speed of light $c \approx 3 \cdot 10^5$ km/sec; see, e.g., [1], [5]. As a result, for example, for a typical laptop of size $\approx 30$ cm, the fastest we can send a signal across the laptop is $\dfrac{30 \text{ cm}}{3 \cdot 10^5 \text{ km/sec}} \approx 10^{-9}$ sec – during this time, a usual few-Gigaflop laptop performs quite a few operations. To further speed up computations, we thus need to further decrease the size of the processors. To be able to fit Gigabytes of data – i.e., billions of cells – within a small area, we need to attain a very small cell size. At present, a typical cell consists of several dozen molecules. As we decrease the size further, we get to a few-molecule size, at which stage we need to take into account the fact that for molecules and atoms, physics is different: quantum effects become dominant; see, e.g., [1], [5].

At first, quantum effects were mainly viewed as a nuisance. For example, one of the features of quantum world is that its results are usually probabilistic. So, if we simply decrease the cell size but use the same computer engineering techniques, then, instead of getting the desired results all the time, we will start getting other results with some probability – and this probability of undesired results increases as we decrease the size of the computing cells.

However, researchers found out that by appropriately modifying the corresponding algorithms, we can often not only avoid the probability-related problem but, even better, make computations faster. The resulting algorithms are known as algorithms of *quantum computing*; see, e.g., [2], [6].

**Quantum computing will enable us to decode all traditionally encoded messages.** One of the spectacular algorithms of quantum computing is Shor's algorithm for fast factorization of large integers; see, e.g., [2]–[4].

The importance of this algorithm comes from the fact that in the modern world, most encryption schemes – e.g., schemes that underlie https, the backbone of the online commerce – as based on the RSA algorithm, the algorithm whose crypto applications are based on the difficulty of factorizing large integers. To form an at-present-unbreakable code, the user selects two large prime numbers $P_1$ and $P_2$ – that will form his private code – and transmits to everyone their product $n = P_1 \cdot P_2$ that everyone can use to encrypt their messages. At present, the only way to decode this message is to know the values $P_i$.

Shor's algorithm allows quantum computers to effectively find $P_i$ based on $n$ and thus, to read practically all the secret messages that have been sent so far. This algorithm is one of the main reasons why governments throughout the world are investing in the design of quantum computers.

**Quantum cryptography: an unbreakable alternative to the**

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**current cryptographic schemes.** The fact that RSA-based cryptographic schemes can be broken by quantum computing does not mean that there will be no secrets: researchers have invented a quantum-based encryption scheme that cannot be thus broken. This scheme, by the way, is already used for secret communications.

**Remaining problems and what we do in this paper.** In addition to the current cryptographic scheme, one can propose its modifications which also serve the same purpose. This possibility raises a natural question: which of these scheme is the best?

In this paper, we show that the current cryptographic scheme is, in some reasonable sense, optimal.

## II. Quantum Cryptography: Main Idea

**Quantum physics: main ideas.** One of the main ideas behind quantum physics is that in the quantum world, in addition to the regular states, we can also have linear combinations of these states, with complex coefficients; such combinations are known as *superpositions* [1], [5].

For example, for a single 1-bit memory cell, which in the classical physics can only have states 0 and 1 – these states are denoted by $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$ – we can also have superpositions $c_0 \cdot |0\rangle + c_1 \cdot |1\rangle$, where $c_0$ and $c_1$ are complex numbers. If we try to measure the bit in this state, we get 0 with probability $|c_0|^2$ and 1 with probability $|c_1|^2$. After the measurement, not only we get the measurement result, but the state also turns, correspondingly, into either $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$.

Since we can get either 0 or 1, these probabilities should add up to 1, so we get the condition $|c_0|^2 + |c_1|^2 = 1$ for the above expression to be a physically meaningful state.

In addition to usual operations with bits, we can also perform *unitary* operations, i.e., linear transformations that preserve the property $|c_0|^2 + |c_1|^2 = 1$. One such transformation is *Walsh-Hadamard (WH)* transformation that transforms $|0\rangle$ into

$$|0'\rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |1\rangle$$

and $|1\rangle$ into

$$|1'\rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |0\rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |1\rangle;$$

see, e.g., [2], [6]. In geometric terms – if we represent each pair $(c_0, c_1)$ as a point in a 2-D plane – this transformation, crudely speaking, corresponds to rotation by 45 degrees.

According to the above description of the measurement process, if we measure the bit 0 or 1 in each of the states $|0'\rangle$ or $|1'\rangle$, then we will get 0 or 1 with equal probability $1/2$. So, if we measure 0 or 1, then:

- if we are in the state $|0\rangle$, then the state does not change and we get the measurement result 0 with probability 1;
- if we are in the state $|1\rangle$, then the state does not change and we get the measurement result 1 with probability 1;
- if we are in one of the states $|0'\rangle$ or $|1'\rangle$, then:
  - with probability $1/2$, we get the measurement result 0 and the state changes into $|0\rangle$; and
  - with probability $1/2$, we get the measurement result 1 and the state changes into $|1\rangle$.

In addition to measuring whether we are in the state $|0\rangle$ or in the state $|1\rangle$, we can also measure whether we have $|0'\rangle$ or $|1'\rangle$. In this case, similarly:

- if we are in the state $|0'\rangle$, then the state does not change and we get measurement result $0'$ with probability 1;
- if we are in the state $|1'\rangle$, then the state does not change and we get measurement result $1'$ with probability 1;
- if we are in one of the states $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$, then:
  - with probability $1/2$, we get the measurement result $0'$ and the state changes into $|0'\rangle$; and
  - with probability $1/2$, we get the measurement result $1'$ and the state changes into $|1'\rangle$.

*Comment.* One can check that if we apply WH transformation twice, then we get the same state as before. Indeed, due to linearity,

$$\mathrm{WH}(0') = \mathrm{WH}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |1\rangle\right) =$$

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot WH(|0\rangle) + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot WH(|1\rangle) =$$

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |0\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |1\rangle\right) + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |0\rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot |1\rangle\right) =$$

$$|0\rangle$$

and similarly, $\mathrm{WH}(|1'\rangle) = |1\rangle$.

**Resulting idea of quantum cryptography.** The sender – who, in cryptography, is usually called Alice – sends each bit

- either as $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$ (this orientation is usually denoted by +)
- or as $|0'\rangle$ or $|1'\rangle$ (this orientation is usually denoted by $\times$).

The eavesdropper – who, in cryptography, is usually called Eve – does not know in which orientation each bit is sent.

The only way for Eve to eavesdrop is to measure the message bit by bit. If accidentally, Eve selects the same orientation as Alice, then, as we have mentioned earlier, this measurement does not change the transmitted signal.

However, if Eve's orientation is different from Alice's, then no matter what was the original signal, Eve gets 0 or 1 with probability $1/2$ – and, moreover, the signal changes into 0 or 1 with probability $1/2$. Thus, the signal is lost. As a result, with probability $1/2$, the receiver – who, in cryptography, is usually called Bob – after his measurement, gets a random bit.

By comparing what Alice sent with what Bob measured, we can see that something was interfering – and this, we will be able to detect the presence of the eavesdropper.

Let us describe how this idea is implemented in the current quantum cryptography algorithm.

## III. Current Quantum Cryptography Algorithm: Reminder

**Sending a preliminary message.** Before Alice sends the actual message, she needs to check that the communication channel is secure, that there is no eavesdropping.

For this purpose, Alice uses a random number generator to select $n$ random bits $b_1, \ldots, b_n$ – each of which is equal to 0 or 1 with probability $1/2$. These bits will be sent to Bob.

Alice also selects $n$ more random bits $r_1, \ldots, r_n$. Based on these bits, Alice sends the bits $b_i$ as follows:

- if $r_i = 0$, then the bit $b_i$ is sent by using the + orientation, i.e., Alice sends $|0\rangle$ if $b_i = 0$ and $|1\rangle$ if $b_i = 1$;
- if $r_i = 1$, then the bit $b_i$ is sent by using the $\times$ orientation, i.e., Alice sends $|0'\rangle$ if $b_i = 0$ and $|1'\rangle$ if $b_i = 1$.

**Receiving the preliminary message.** Independently, Bob selects $n$ random bits $s_1, \ldots, s_n$ that determine how he measures the signal that he receives from Alice:

- if $s_i = 0$, then Bob measures whether the $i$-th received signal is $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$;
- if $s_i = 1$, then Bob measures whether the $i$-th received signal is $|0'\rangle$ or $|1'\rangle$.

**Checking for eavesdroppers.** After this, for $k$ out of $n$ bits, Alice openly sends to Bob her bits $b_i$ and her orientations $r_i$, and Bob sends to Alice his orientations $s_i$ and the signals $b'_i$ that he measured.

In half of the cases, the orientations $r_i$ and $s_i$ should coincide, in which case, if there is no eavesdropper, the signal $b'_i$ measured by Bob should coincide with the signal $b_i$ that Alice sent. So, if $b'_i \neq b_i$ for some $i$, this means that there is an eavesdropper.

If there is an eavesdropper, then with probability $1/2$, Eve will select a different orientation. In half of such cases, the eavesdropping with change the original signal. So, for each bit, the probability that we will have $b'_i \neq b_i$ (and thus, that the eavesdropper will be detected) is equal to $1/4$. Thus, the probability that the eavesdropper will not be detected by this bit is $1 - 1/4 = 3/4$. The probability that Eve will not be detected in all $k/2$ cases is thus equal to the product of $k/2$ such probabilities, i.e., to $(3/4)^{k/2}$. For a sufficiently large $k$, this probability of not-detecting-eavesdropping is very small.

Thus, if $b'_i = b_i$ for all $k$ bits $i$, this means that with high confidence, there is no eavesdropping: the communication channel between Alice and Bob is secure.

**Preparing to send a message.** Now, for each of the remaining $(n - k)$ bits, Alice and Bob openly exchange orientations $r_i$ and $s_i$. For half of these bits, these orientations must coincide. For these bits, since there is no eavesdropping, Alice and Bob know that the signal $b'_i$ measured by Bob is the same as the signal $b_i$ sent to Alice. So, there are $B \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (n - k)/2$ bits $b_i = b'_i$ that they both know but no one else knows.

**Sending the actual message.** Now, Alice takes the $B$-bit message $m_1, \ldots, m_B$ that she wants to send, forms the encoded message $m'_i \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} m_i \oplus b_i$, where $\oplus$ means addition modulo 2 (or, equivalently, exclusive or), and openly sends the encoded message $m'_i$.

**Receiving the actual message.** Upon receiving the message $m'_i$, Bob reconstructs the original message as $m_i = m'_i \oplus b_i$.

## IV. A General Family of Quantum Cryptography Algorithms: Description

In the current quantum cryptography algorithm, Alice selects one of the possible two orientations $+$ and $\times$ with probability 0.5. Similarly, Bob selects one of the two possible orientations $+$ and $\times$ with probability 0.5.

It is therefore reasonable to consider a more general scheme, in which:

- Alice selects the orientation $+$ with some probability $a_+$ (which is not necessarily equal to 0.5) and, correspondingly, the other orientation $\times$ with the remaining probability $a_\times = 1 - a_+$; and
- Bob select the orientation $+$ with some probability $b_+$ (which is not necessarily equal to 0.5) and, correspondingly, the other orientation $\times$ with the remaining probability $b_\times = 1 - b_+$.

A natural question is: which probabilities $a_+$ and $b_+$ should they choose to make the connection maximally secure, i.e., to maximize the probability of detecting the eavesdropper?

## V. Proving That the Current Quantum Cryptography Algorithm Is Optimal

**What do we want to maximize?** We want to maximize the probability of detecting an eavesdropper. The eavesdropper also selects one of the two orientations $+$ or $\times$. Let $e_+$ be the probability with which the eavesdropper (Eve) select the orientation $+$, then Eve will select $\times$ with the remaining probability $e_\times = 1 - e_+$.

As we have seen from the description of the current algorithms, Alice and Bob can only use bits for which their selected orientations coincide, because in this case, the message bit remains unchanged. If in this case, it so happens that Eve selects the same orientation, then her observation will also not change this bit, and thus, we will not be able to detect the eavesdropping.

The only case when we can detect the eavesdropping is when Alice and Bob have the same orientation, but Eve has a different one. There are two such cases:

- the first case is when Alice and Bob select $+$ and Eve selects $\times$;
- the second case is when Alice and Bob select $\times$ and Eve selects $+$.

Alice, Bob, and Eve act independently, thus, the probability $p_1$ of the first case is equal to the product of the probabilities that Alice selects $+$, that Bob selects $+$, and that Eve selects $\times$:

$$p_1 = a_+ \cdot b_+ \cdot e_\times.$$

Similarly, the probability $p_2$ of the second case is equal to the product of the probabilities that Alice selects $\times$, that Bob selects $\times$, and that Eve selects $+$:

$$p_2 = a_\times \cdot b_\times \cdot e_+.$$

These two cases are incompatible, so the overall probability $p$ of detecting the eavesdropper is equal to the sum of the above two probabilities:

$$p = a_+ \cdot b_+ \cdot e_\times + a_\times \cdot b_\times \cdot e_+.$$

Taking into account that $a_\times = 1 - a_+$, $b_\times = 1 - b_+$, and $e_\times = 1 - e_+$, we conclude that this detection probability takes the form

$$p = a_+ \cdot b_+ \cdot (1 - e_+) + (1 - a_+) \cdot (1 - b_+) \cdot e_+. \quad (1)$$

This probability depends on Eve's selection $e_+$. As typical in game-theoretic situations, we would like to maximize the probability of detection in the worst case for us, when Eve uses her best strategy. Eve's strategy is to minimize the detection probability (1). So, we want to find the values $a_+$ and $b_+$ for which the minimum of the expression (1) over all possible values $e_+$ is the largest possible. In other words, we want to maximize the following expression:

$$J = \min_{e_+ \in [0,1]} (a_+ \cdot b_+ \cdot (1 - e_+) + (1 - a_+) \cdot (1 - b_+) \cdot e_+). \quad (2)$$

**Let us analyze the resulting optimization problem.** One can easily see that, once the values $a_+$ and $b_+$ are fixed, the expression (1) that Eve wants to minimize is a linear function of $e_+$: namely, it can be described as

$$p = a_+ \cdot b_+ - a_+ \cdot b_+ \cdot e_+ + (1 - a_+) \cdot (1 - b_+) \cdot e_+ =$$
$$a_+ \cdot b_+ + e_+ \cdot ((1 - a_+) \cdot (1 - b_+) - a_+ \cdot b_+).$$

We want to minimize this expression over all possible values of $e_+$ from the interval $[0, 1]$. It is known that a linear function on an interval always attains its smallest possible value at one of the endpoints. Thus, to find the minimum of the above expression over $e_+$, it is sufficient to consider the two endpoints $e_+ = 0$ and $e_+ = 1$ of this interval, and takes the smallest of the resulting two values.

For $e_+ = 0$, the expression (1) becomes $a_+ \cdot b_+$. For $e_+ = 1$, the expression (1) becomes $(1 - a_+) \cdot (1 - b_+)$. Thus, the minimum (2) of the expression (1) can be equivalently described as:

$$J = \min(a_+ \cdot b_+, (1 - a_+) \cdot (1 - b_+)). \quad (3)$$

We need to find the values $a_+$ and $b_+$ for which this quantity attains its largest possible value.

Let us first, for each $a_+$, find the value $b_+$ for which the expression (3) attains its maximum possible value. In the formula (3), the first of the two expressions, namely, the expression $a_+ \cdot b_+$, is increasing from 0 to $a_+$ as $b_+$ goes from 0 to 1. The second expression $(1 - a_+) \cdot (1 - b_+)$ decreases from $1 - a_+$ to 0 as $b_+$ goes from 0 to 1. Thus:

- for small $b_+$, the first of the two expressions is smaller, thus for these $b_+$, the function (3) is equal to the first expression $J = a_+ \cdot b_+$ and is, thus, increasing with $b_+$;
- for larger $b_+$, the second of the two expressions is smaller, thus for these $b_+$, the function (3) is equal to the second expression $J = (1 - a_+) \cdot (1 - b_+)$ and is, thus, decreasing with $b_+$.

Since the expression (3) first increases and then decreases, its maximum is attained at a point when the expression (3) switches from increasing to decreasing, i.e., at a point $b_+$ at which the two products that form the expression (3) are equal:

$$a_+ \cdot b_+ = (1 - b_+) \cdot (1 - a_+).$$

If we open the parentheses, we conclude that

$$a_+ \cdot b_+ = 1 - a_+ - b_+ + a_+ \cdot b_+.$$

Subtracting $a_+ \cdot b_+$ from both sides of this equality, we get $0 = 1 - a_+ - b_+$, thus $b_+ = 1 - a_+$.

Substituting this expression for $b_+$ into the formula (3), we conclude that

$$J = \min(a_+ \cdot (1 - a_+), (1 - a_+) \cdot a_+),$$

i.e., that $J = a_+ \cdot (1 - a_+)$. We want to find the value $a_+$ that maximizes this expression. To find this value, we differentiate this expression with respect to $a_+$ and equate the resulting derivative to 0. As a result, we get the equation $1 - 2a_+ = 0$, hence $a_+ = 0.5$. Since $b_+ = 1 - a_+$, we get

$$b_+ = 1 - 0.5 = 0.5.$$

Thus, the current quantum cryptography algorithm is indeed optimal.

*Comment.* Similar arguments show that the best is to use 45 degrees rotation, and that the best is to have 0s and 1s in $b_i$ with probability 0.5.

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